Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University
Posted on: Friday, 29 August 2003, 06:00 CDT
MICHAEL FRIEDMAN, Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001. Pp. xiv + 141. ISBN 1-57586-292-1. L12.50, $19.50 (paperback).
DOI: 10.1017/S0007087403464972
This book is concerned with the nature of science, and the proper relationship between science and philosophy. It is primarily a work of philosophy, but the position presented is one which claims to both grow from historical study and have implications for the study of the history of science. This concern is one of the central issues of the book, and the one on which I will focus in this review.
Friedman's position is a development of both Kant and Kuhn. Kant claimed that certain beliefs are essential if our empirical beliefs are to be possible. Kuhn developed a theory on which science was distinguished from other disciplines by its consensus on the basic rules of the game, and by occasional revolutionary upheavals as the rules were changed. Friedman claims that there are a-priori parts of scientific theories that make the empirical parts thinkable but that they change during revolutions.
In a period of normal science, between the changes, Friedman sees science as an exemplar of communicative rationality. All people within the field agree on the important issues, and on the evidence needed to make a decision. At times of revolutionary change this breaks down.
In philosophy, according to Friedman, there is no agreement on solutions or methods. Rather, there is agreement on which problems and contributions to those problems must be taken seriously. Thus philosophy cannot be made part of science.
During a revolution, however, philosophy can be very useful to science. A scientist who frames his revolutionary change in terms of a serious contribution to an important problem has a rational claim to be taken seriously. He argues that Einstein worked in exactly this way while developing relativity.
As a guiding theory in history of science, Friedman's account suggests that the relationship between science and philosophy is close only at times of revolution, but that it is essential then. Indeed, the development of philosophy could explain why scientific revolutions occurred when they did. While the account of relativity seems quite convincing to a non-specialist, Friedman's attempt to extend the account to other parts of science, such as the chemical revolution and the acceptance of evolution, is less detailed. However, examining the issues through this lens might well provide new insights into these episodes.
DAVID CHART
University of Cambridge
Copyright Cambridge University Press, Publishing Division Mar 2003
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